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This paper sets out to explain why Spain experienced a full-fledged sovereign debt crisis and had to resort to eu-
roarea financial assistance for its banks, whereas Italy did not. It undertakes a structured comparison, dissecting 
the sovereign debt crisis into a banking crisis and a balance of payments crisis. It argues that the distinctive fea-
tures of bank business models and of national banking systems in Italy and Spain have considerable analytical 
leverage in explaining the different scenarios of the crises in each country. This ‘bank-based’ analysis contrib-
utes to the flourishing literature that examines changes in banking with a view to account for the differentiated 
impact of the global banking crisis first and the sovereign debt crisis in the euroarea later. 
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1. Introduction
The sovereign debt crisis that began in the euroarea 
in 2009 dealt a major blow to the international econ-
omy. The periphery of the euroarea was particularly 
badly hit by this crisis: Greece was the first victim, 
followed by Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and then Italy. 
Despite the fact that these countries – often collec-
tively referred to with the unflattering acronym of 
PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain) 
– were hit by the sovereign debt crisis, there are im-
portant differences in the causes, dynamics, and out-
come of the crises in these countries. 
In June 2012, the Spanish government requested eu-
roarea financial assistance for its banks, which the 
eurogroup approved during its July meeting. They 
agreed to provide financial assistance from the eu-
roarea member states toward the Spanish govern-
ment’s bank recapitalization fund, and then channel 
the funds to ailing financial institutions. In Decem-
ber 2012, the Spanish government formally request-
ed the disbursement of about 39.5bn euros of these 
funds. By contrast, the Italian government has not 
requested outside financial assistance to date.  
This paper sets out to explain why Spain experienced 
a full-fledged sovereign debt crisis and had to resort 
to euroarea financial assistance for some of its banks, 
whereas Italy did not. This is puzzling because at the 
onset of the global banking crisis in 2007, Spain had 
a surplus in its budget and its public debt was much 
lower than in Italy, whose public debt exceeded 100 
percent of GDP. Hence, Italy seemed a more like-
ly candidate for a sovereign debt crisis than Spain, 
which had been on sound fiscal footing (see Table 1). 
Methodologically, the paper engages in a structured 
comparison of the sovereign debt crisis scenarios in 
Italy and Spain dividing the sovereign debt crisis into 
a banking crisis and balance of payments crisis (Ka-
minsky and Reinhart 1999). 
The paper argues that Spain experienced a severe 
banking crisis including the bailout of a number of 
the country’s banks that substantially increased the 
public deficit and debt. By contrast, Italian banks, 
with one exception, did not experience such sig-
nificant losses, thus they needed no substantial gov-
ernment recapitalization. At the same time, both 
countries experienced a balance of payments crisis, 
which was more intense in Spain because of a higher 
net foreign debt than in Italy. A large part of Spain’s 
debt was private, generated by banks and fuelled by 
a property bubble. By contrast, Italy suffered from 
chronic fiscal imbalances; it had lived with a high 
level of public debt (mostly held domestically), but 
posted primary surpluses for decades. However, Ita-
ly’s low growth rate called into question the sustain-
ability of its level of debt.
While the interest of this article is mainly of an em-
pirical nature, it contributes to the innovative body 
of scholarly works focused on bank business models 
and national banking systems (Hardie and Howarth 
2013; Hardie et al. 2013) and builds on previous 
works focused on national financial systems (Allen 
and Gale 2000; Deeg 1999). It develops a ‘bank-
based’ analysis not only for the banking crisis, but 
also for the balance of payments crisis, both of which 
conflated into the sovereign debt crisis in the periph-
ery of the euroarea. Furthermore, it examines two 
somewhat understudied cases in Southern Europe, 
teasing out their distinctive features of bank business 
models and national banking systems that account 
for the different crisis scenarios in Italy and Spain. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly 
reviews the literature on national financial systems, 
outlining the main features of the bank business 
models and banking systems in Italy and Spain. Sec-
tions 3 and 4 analyze the anatomy of the banking cri-
sis and the balance of payments crisis to demonstrate 
the role that banks held in fuelling these crises in 
Spain, but not Italy. Section 5 concludes the article 
by summarizing the main findings and discussing 
their generalisability.  
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by national financial systems over the last decade and 
to explain the different impact of the global bank-
ing crisis across countries. They develop the concept 
of ‘market-based banking,’ noting that banking over 
the last decade has become mostly market-based, 
meaning that banks fund themselves in the wholesale 
market (market-based liabilities) and invest in non-
traditional banking activities (market-based assets). 
Consequently, three main types of national financial 
systems can be identified: those where non-market 
based liabilities (i.e., deposits) finance market-based 
assets; those where market-based liabilities finance 
non-market based assets (Spain and Italy are includ-
ed in this category); and those where market-based 
assets are financed by market-based liabilities. Fur-
thermore, these authors argue that ‘the level and form 
of market-based banking provides a better guide to 
the impact of the international financial crisis upon 
different countries than regulatory framework or po-
litical economy type’ (Hardie and Howarth 2013). 
The higher the market-based assets and liabilities, the 
higher the exposure of national banking systems to 
the global banking crisis. 
In this typology, Italy and Spain are classified next 
to each other as banking systems that are moderately 
market-based; Spain has somewhat more market-
2. A ‘bank-based’ analysis of the sovereign debt 
crisis in the euroarea
National banking systems have seldom been the 
subject of scholarly works in political economy, 
with a number of notable exceptions (Allen and 
Gale 2000; Deeg 1999; Deeg 2005; Deeg 2010). 
Until recently, the standard work of reference was 
Zysman’s Governments, Markets and Growth: 
Financial Systems and the Politics of Industrial 
Change (1983), which distinguished between cred-
it-based and capital market-based financial sys-
tems. In bank-based financial systems, banks per-
form the key function of financial intermediation 
between household-savers and firms, providing 
funding to the real economy. In the capital mar-
ket-based financial systems, markets are the main 
source of (rather volatile) credit to the real econ-
omy. In this typology, both Italy and Spain were 
classified as bank-based financial systems, as were 
the main continental countries, such as France and 
Germany.
In their pioneering work, Hardie and Howarth 
(2013, see also Hardie et al. 2013) challenge the 
analytical usefulness of this  typology arguing that 
it fails to detect the significant changes undergone 
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based liabilities than Italy, and Italy has somewhat 
more market-based assets than Spain (Hardie and 
Howarth 2013). This explanation is problematic be-
cause though it fits well with the initial stage of the 
global banking crisis, when neither Italian banks nor 
Spanish banks experienced significant losses, the 
moderate level of market-based banking does not 
account for the banking crisis in Spain (as opposed 
to Italy) from 2009 onwards, as discussed in Section 
3. Moreover, the typology developed by Hardie and 
Howarth does not allow for predictions about how 
the sovereign debt crisis would play out following 
the global banking crisis because they focused on the 
latter. To be fair, Hardie and Howarth mention the 
importance of nationally distinctive features in order 
to explain crisis outcomes in various countries, es-
pecially Italy and Spain, which do not fully fit their 
model, but they do not systematically investigate 
this crucial point. The research in this article builds 
on and further develops the ‘bank-based’ approach 
developed by Hardie and Howarth, identifying the 
distinctive features of bank business models and na-
tional banking systems that explain the different sov-
ereign debt crisis scenarios in Italy and Spain. 
2.1 Italian and Spanish bank business models and 
banking systems
In the run up to the global banking crisis, Italian and 
Spanish banks had a ‘traditional’ business model, 
as compared to other European banks. In Italy and 
Spain, the majority of banks’ assets were loans to 
customers, and a significant part of these assets in-
volved government securities, which at that time 
were considered among the safest possible asset 
investments (Pagoulatos and Quaglia 2013; Royo 
2013b). There was, however, one main difference be-
tween Italy and Spain as far as assets are concerned. 
Unlike Spanish banks, Italian banks did not fuel a 
property bubble; namely, they lent to households less 
frequently than either Spanish or Greek banks. Italian 
banks predominantly lent to non-financial corpora-
tions; the bulk these loans went to services and indus-
try, not construction (see Table 2). A property bubble 
can also come from residential mortgage lending, 
but there was no significant rise in consumer lending 
by banks in the years preceding the crisis in Italy. 
Lending to non-financial corporations (NFCs) was 
somewhat higher in Spain, than in Italy and Greece. 
However, in Spain, the NFC lending included a large 
proportion of property developers, especially among 
cajas, as explained below. Moreover, loans made to 
consumers for the purpose of house purchases were 
the vast majority of the total loans to consumers (see 
Table 3).
On the liabilities side, both Italian and Spanish banks 
had a broad and stable funding base. Funding from 
retail customers (considered more stable than whole-
sale funding) constituted a large share of the total li-
abilities in both countries (Pagoulatos and Quaglia 
2013; Royo 2013b). However, banks in both coun-
18
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tries depended on wholesale inter-bank funding, with 
some important differences. To begin with, Italian 
banks primarily lent to each other. Indeed, the aver-
age home bias for Italy was the highest among the 
euroarea’s national banking systems (Manna 2011). 
Furthermore, Italian banks issued several debt se-
curities, selling them to their customers, a funding 
method that exposed them less to the vagaries in the 
financial markets. Italian banks had greater access to 
retail investors for bond issues compared to other Eu-
ropean banks (Bank of Italy 2011). 
Considering both assets and liabilities simultaneous-
ly, a crucial difference between Italian and Spanish 
banks is that Spanish banks borrowed on the inter-
bank market and channeled this funding to the con-
struction sector through mortgage loans and loans 
to property developers. Hence, the banking system 
in Spain intermediated capital inflows,sustaining a 
massive construction boom (Gros 2012). On the in-
terbank market, Italian banks borrowed to a more 
limited extent than their Spanish counterparts, and 
did not use this funding to provide credit to property 
developers and mortgages. Italian banks did not fuel 
a credit boom. Contrary to Spain, Italy experienced 
lower capital inflows, which were not intermediated 
by banks; most of these capital inflows were purchas-
es of government bonds. 
The other important difference is that Spain, unlike 
Italy had a dual banking system of (private) commer-
cial banks and (public) saving banks, the cajas, which 
were unlisted in the stock market and accounted for 
half of the financial sector’s assets. Cajas were pecu-
liar credit institutions because they used to dedicate 
a significant portion of their provisions (usually over 
20 percent) to social causes; prior to the crisis, they 
had strong links with their regional and local govern-
ments. In fact, recent studies show that political con-
trol of cajas was one main reason for their troubles. 
Moreover, the cajas were subject to a distinctive reg-
ulatory framework, and the Bank of Spain had lim-
ited supervisory competences on cajas (Royo 2013c). 
In Italy, saving banks were subject to the same reg-
ulatory regime as commercial banks in addition to 
the stringent supervision of the Bank of Italy. In-
deed, many casse (formerly, public saving banks) 
had been merged by commercial banks during the 
1990s and 2000s, after the Amato Carli reform. Prior 
to the ‘Amato-Carli’ reform (named after two trea-
sury ministers who proposed and enacted it), Italian 
18
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savings banks were publicly owned with close ties 
to local institutions and politicians (Deeg 2012). The 
1990 reform introduced the concept of banks as profit 
making institutions; the reform was instrumental in 
promoting the privatization, the concentration, and 
the modernization of the Italian banking system (Ci-
occa 2005; Panetta 2004). It facilitated the merger 
of commercial and savings banks, which were not 
in direct competition (Deeg 2012). This reform also 
reduced the involvement of politicians and local au-
thorities in bank management (with one main excep-
tion, discussed in the following section); hence the 
politicization of Italian banks was limited compared 
to Spain.
3. The (late) banking crisis in Spain, but not Italy
Initially, after the US collapse of the the subprime 
market in late 2007 and the bankruptcy of the US fi-
nancial firm Lehman Brothers in October 2008, Ital-
ian and Spanish banks weathered the banking crisis 
rather well; they experienced no major losses and re-
quired no state recapitalisation. Italian and Spanish 
banks were relatively sheltered from the most intense 
forces of global financial contagion in 2008-2009. 
On the assets side, they had a limited amount of 
market-based assets; they had not invested in ‘fancy’ 
financial products that later proved to be ‘toxic’ and 
the majority of banks’ assets comprised of customer 
loans. As for liabilities, Italian and Spanish banks 
had a broad and stable funding base, mainly from re-
tail customers (see Section 2). Moreover, the Bank of 
Spain had imposed a regulatory framework requir-
ing higher provisioning thereby providing cushions 
to Spanish banks to initially absorb losses caused by 
the outset of the global financial crisis (Royo 2013a). 
In late 2009, major financial problems began for 
many of the Spanish savings banks (cajas). Unlike 
Italian banks that mainly lent to non-financial cor-
porations, especially small and medium enterprises, 
Spanish banks, especially the cajas, lent to property 
developers as well as providing consumers credit for 
mortgages (see Section 2). This turbo-charged lend-
ing, funded by the interbank-market on the liability 
side of the Spanish banks’ balance sheets, is crucial 
to understand the banking crisis in Spain. During 
the boom years, cajas successfully captured market 
shares from banks, investing heavily in real estate, 
lending both to consumers and developers. Both big 
Spanish banks and cajas took on significant levels of 
interbank liabilities. However, the cajas in particular 
expanded geographically and strengthened their na-
tional presence, as illustrated most visibly by a rapid 
growth in the number of employees and branches. 
When the economic recession reached the country 
following the global banking crisis, they were ex-
posed to the collapse of the construction sector and 
the payment difficulties of mortgage holders. Cajas, 
highly dependent on international wholesale financ-
ing because of their business model, were forced to 
ask the government and the European Central Bank 
(ECB) for liquidity when wholesale markets froze. 
However, Spain was unique in that the largest banks 
did not face significant problems. While cajas strug-
gled under the weight of bad mortgages and loans to 
construction companies, the exposure of ‘Big Three’s’ 
large banks (BBVA, Santander, and La Caixa) to tox-
ic assets associated with the Spanish real estate sector 
was a relatively small setback. BBVA and Santander 
diversified internationally, gaining access to funding 
that allowed for liquidation of toxic property assets 
at a lower price compared to that of their rivals and 
with limited damage to their earnings. Hence, for the 
largest Spanish banks, geographical diversification 
helped counterbalance their domestic losses. 
Since the inception of the crisis, Spain adopted five 
financial reforms in three years and implemented 
three rounds of bank mergers, the number of cajas 
dropped from 45 to 9. The Spanish government re-
peatedly increased capital provisions; those banks 
unable to meet the new standards could borrow addi-
tional money in state-backed convertible bonds car-
rying a ten percent interest rate. Furthermore, banks 
could transfer their riskiest assets to state-guaranteed 
asset management companies to help hurry the sale 
of real estate assets the bank held. Each bank was 
forced to create a bad bank into which it put physical 
property assets at devalued prices, in preparation for 
potential sales to outside investors (Royo 2013c).
In May 2012, the Spanish government was forced to 
nationalize Bankia, the country’s largest real estate 
lender that was created by the merge of several ailing 
cajas. The Bank of Spain oversaw the largest bank 
nationalization in the country’s history. The failure 
18
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of Bankia validated concerns regarding insufficient 
regulatory oversight, as well as the perception that 
Spanish banks and the Bank of Spain had down-
played the risk posed by real estate loans. In this re-
gard, the supervisory failure of the Bank of Spain had 
much to do with the political control of cajas. Indeed, 
the deeper the political connection of the managers to 
these entities, the more likely it was that the Bank of 
Spain would look the other way; and conversely, the 
more politicized the cajas, the deeper their financial 
problems were during the crisis (Garicano 2012). 
In August 2012, a new financial reform was approved 
in response to the EU financial rescue package. As a 
result, the Spanish government created a ‘bad bank’ 
that could absorb the toxic assets from the real estate 
sector, and had the authority to buy and sell a variety 
of assets, as well as issue bonds. The 2012 reform 
reinforced the Bank of Spain’s role in the creation of 
the ‘bad bank.’ It also established a new process to re-
structure and liquidate financial institutions, giving a 
central procedural role to the Fund for Orderly Bank 
Restructuring and the Bank of Spain. Finally, the re-
form reduced the role of the regional governments in 
the restructuring and liquidation of cajas as well as 
saving cooperatives. The five financial reforms im-
plemented in less than three years were largely per-
ceived as ‘too little and too late,’ and failed to sway 
investors’ confidence in the Spanish financial sector. 
Both the Socialist and Conservative governments 
were reluctant to admit the depth of the liquidity and 
solvency problems of many institutions, particularly 
the cajas, where politics played a role throughout the 
crisis. 
Italian banks did not provide substantial funding to 
the construction sector; instead, they mainly lent to 
small and medium enterprises. The number of banks 
lending to consumers was moderate, especially loans 
made to consumers for the purpose of house purchas-
es (see Section 2). Consequently, Italy did not suffer 
a property boom and bust. When the global banking 
crisis broke, Italian banks mainly restricted credit to 
the real economy, which deepened the economic re-
cession but did not cause major losses for banks on 
the assets side. On the liabilities side, at the height of 
the crisis, banks cut their lending to those abroad far 
more than their lending to those domestically based. 
So the fact that Italian banks lent to each other meant 
that inter-bank borrowing was more stable than in 
those systems where inter-bank funding was largely 
from abroad (Manna 2011).
The only Italian bank that experienced serious losses 
as a consequnence of the global financial crisis was 
the Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS), the world’s old-
est bank. The origin of the MPS’s financial problems 
was its (overpriced) acquisition of Banca Antonve-
neta for 9bn euros in late 2007.  Santander, which 
sold Antonveneta to the MPS, had valued Antonve-
neta, minus a subsidiary that it kept, at 5.6bn euros. 
This acquisition gave the MPS the largest corporate 
loan book relative to its size in Italy and substantially 
weakened its capital base at a time when the financial 
crisis was gaining momentum. After the acquisition, 
the MPS had to rebuild capital. In March 2009, MPS 
took 1.9bn euros in state capital injections in the form 
of ‘Tremonti Bonds’ (named after the Treasury min-
ister who promoted them). Afterward, the MPS did 
several (non-public) derivatives deals with Deutsche 
Bank and Nomura in order to keep huge losses off its 
balance sheet (Financial Times, 14 February  2013).
Once these deals (or rather the losses they were cov-
ering up) became public and as a consequence of 
moral suasion from the Bank of Italy, the top man-
agement of the MPS was replaced in April 2012 and 
was subsequently subjected to judicial investigations. 
The new management of the MPS immediately made 
public the huge losses suffered by the bank, making 
clear that they needed state financial assistance. The 
second bailout worth 3.9bn euros (the so-called Mon-
ti bonds, named after the prime minister who pro-
posed them) was decided in January 2013 (Financial 
Times, 28 January 2013). It was subjected to scrutiny 
by the ECB, particularly the Directorate General on 
Competition Policy of the European Commission. 
Indeed, the European Commission, as part of its state 
aid policy, was very active in monitoring public fi-
nancial support offered to banks across the EU dur-
ing the crisis. 
The MPS’s downfall discredited the bank’s former 
management and exposed the close ties between pol-
iticians and the bank. The management of the MPS 
was appointed by the bank’s largest shareholder, the 
MPS Foundation, which controlled more than fifty 
percent of the bank’s share. The Foundation, com-
18
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posed mainly of local politicians, used its profits to 
finance a variety of non-bank related local activities, 
such as hospitals, museums, low-cost housing, the 
local soccer team, and even the Palio.  However, un-
like the Spanish cajas, political interference in bank 
management tended to be the exception to the norm 
in Italy, after the so-called ‘Amato-Carli’ reform of 
the 1990s, which opened the door to the privatisa-
tion and modernisation of the Italian banking system. 
Nowadays, foundations hold more than twenty per-
cent shares only in two (large) Italian banks: Monte 
dei Paschi and Banca Intesa (De Bonis et al. 2011).
Despite the MPS debacle, banking supervision in Ita-
ly was assessed as systematic and diligent during the 
crisis and in the years preceding it (IMF 2008). The 
Bank of Italy, like the Bank of Spain, discouraged 
lenders from adopting risky ‘off balance sheet’ ac-
counting methods, as well as from acquiring billions 
of euros of repackaged US subprime mortgages and 
other toxic assets. Moreover, the Bank of Spain and 
Bank of Italy forced all banks to focus on conserva-
tive risk management and quality of capital, limiting 
their leverage and debt equity ratio (Barth, Caprio, 
and Levine 2006).  Clearly, this was not sufficient in 
the case of Spanish cajas, which, as explained above, 
were partly outside the Bank of Spain’s supervisory 
framework.
4. External and internal imbalances in Spain and Italy
In the euroarea, economic imbalances built up over 
the decade prior to the crisis as massive capital flows 
moved from core euroarea countries, first and fore-
most Germany, to Southern euroarea countries. The 
capital-exporting countries invested their surplus 
savings abroad, and a large share of these cross bor-
der flows was intermediated through the global bank-
ing system, especially in capital-importing countries 
(Bank of International Settlements 2010). Similarly, 
in capital-exporting euroarea countries, most of the 
excess savings was intermediated by the banking sys-
tem and other highly regulated intermediaries (e.g., 
insurance companies, pension funds, etc.) (Bank of 
International Settlements 2010). These intermediar-
ies had a strong bias toward investing in the euroarea, 
hence capital outflows were mainly directed towards 
the periphery of the euroarea. However, the inflow 
of foreign capital served for different goals. In Spain 
(like in Ireland), banks borrowed on the wholesale 
market and channeled this funding into the construc-
tion sector domestically (Gros 2012). Contrary to 
Spain, Italy experienced lower capital inflows and 
did not experience a pronounced credit boom: most 
of the capital inflows in Italy were not intermediated 
by banks, but were purchases of government bonds.
Both Italy and Spain suffered from internal and ex-
ternal imbalances. As Bini Smaghi put it (2008), ‘ex-
ternal imbalances are the reflection of internal imbal-
ances.’ The expansion of domestic demand, financed 
by capital inflows, contributed to making Southern 
euroarea countries uncompetitive. Their loss of 
competitiveness was thus a symptom, rather than a 
primary cause for the imbalances (Gros 2012). All 
periphery countries hit by the sovereign debt crisis 
had a persistent current account deficit over the last 
decade, coupled by significant private capital inflows 
from 2002 to 2009. Yet, in comparison to other coun-
tries, in particular to Spain who held the largest cur-
rent account deficit in the euroarea, Italy had a much 
smaller current account deficit.
In both countries, current account imbalances were 
mainly funded through portfolio debt securities and 
bank loans (Merler and Pisani-Ferry 2012). As Mer-
ler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) note, ‘such a financing 
structure, biased towards banks’ intermediation, ren
dered the deficit countries very exposed to the un-
winding of capital inflows.’ Indeed, at the inception 
of the banking crisis, private cross-border flows re-
verted suddenly and a massive withdrawal of foreign 
private resources took place in the Southern euroarea 
countries. These capital outflows were reflected by 
Eurosystem central banks’ position in the TARGET 2 
(the Eurosystem’s interbank payments system). Until 
2007, TARGET 2 positions were close to balanced. 
When the global financial crisis began in 2007, and 
even more so when the sovereign debt crisis broke 
out in 2010, imbalances emerged within TARGET 
2, whereby Germany was the largest creditor and 
Greece, Spain, Ireland, and Portugal were net credi-
tors (see Figure 1). Italy became a major net debtor in 
TARGET 2 in late 2011, as explained below.   
As for internal imbalances, despite the tendency to 
lump Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Ireland (PI-
18
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IGS) together and view the crisis as caused by fiscal-
ly irresponsible governments, it is important to em-
phasize that Spain’s public finances were robust prior 
to the European sovereign debt crisis. Indeed,public 
debt was only 36.3 percent of GDP, and the coun-
try had budget surpluses from 2003 through 2007. 
In Spain, public deficits and debt soared as a conse-
quence of the crisis; in response, the government im-
plemented an 8 bn euro public-works stimulus. These 
expenses, combined with fall in revenue and the need 
to recapitalize a large number of Spanish banks (see 
previous section), regional deficits blew an enormous 
hole in the public accounts (see Table 1). 
When the crisis hit, regions in Spain were shut out 
of credit markets, crippled by mountains of debt ac-
cumulated during boom years, struggling to cut their 
budget deficits. Many of these regions asked the na-
tional government for emergency financing, tapping 
into the 18bn euro fund established by the central 
government to help regional governments meet their 
debt repayment obligations. The regional govern-
ments combined debts of 140bn euros, of which 35bn 
euros matured in 2012. Hence, Spain’s regional state 
structure (with exceptions of Basque Country and 
Navarra) had limited fiscal power, effectively wors-
ening the state of public finance. 
Moreover, the key problem for Spain (unlike Italy) 
was not so much public sector debt in as much as pri-
vate-sector debt, driven by record-low interest rates 
after the country joined the EMU in 1999, fuelled by 
reckless bank investments and loans (see Table 4). 
These, in turn, were funded by capital inflows that 
turbo charged a property bubble that Italy did not ex-
perience. Land prices increased 500 percent in Spain 
between 1997 and 2007. At the end of 2010, the In-
ternational Monetary Fund reported Spain as having 
the largest real estate bubble in the developed world. 
18
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Source: IMF Global Financial Stability Assessment 2012
And yet again, banks were at the heart of this devel-
opment. In Spain, the decision by cajas to channel 
funding disproportionally to the construction sec-
tor (both to construction companies and real estate 
developers), but especially private mortgages,  was 
critical to fuel the bubble in that sector (Serra Ra-
moneda 2011). There was reticence to lend to small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) outside of construc-
tion and real estate sectors. Indeed, restrictive lend-
ing to SMEs was a reason for poor labor market per-
formance because it undercut these firms’ efforts to 
create jobs and innovate (Fishman 2012 293–299). 
The relatively high customer funding gap meant that 
market-based liabilities ‘turbocharged’ traditional 
lending (see Section 2). Spain had high levels of se-
curitized lending (banks transforming mortgages into 
asset-based securities (ABSs)) that contributed to the 
property market bubble. Indeed, between 2000 and 
the summer of 2007, both the securitisation market 
and the covered bond market significantly expanded 
in Spain. These securities were issued for funding 
purposes. Between 2000 and 2007, the net flow of 
loans was persistently above the flow of deposits, and 
Spanish financial institutions relied on bond markets 
to fund this gap. Financial institutions relied not only 
on the securitisation market, but also on other fixed-
income markets for the same purpose, notably in-
cluding the covered bond market. 
In terms of outstanding amounts, by June 2007, 
Spain was ranked second (after the United Kingdom) 
in Europe in the securitization market and third (after 
Germany and Denmark) in the covered bond market. 
Hence, banks’ intermediation played a key role in at-
tracting capital inflows and channeling them in the 
construction sector, rendering the Spanish economy 
vulnerable were there ever to be sudden withdrawal 
of these funds (Merler and Pisani-Ferry 2012). One 
consequence of the global financial crisis has been 
the evaporation of market liquidity; its impact was 
particularly severe for ABSs because market liquid-
ity is an important characteristic of those assets 
(Blanco 2011, 17-19). On the liabilities side, funding 
for Spanish banks was complicated by difficulties in 
accessing international wholesale markets because 
securitization markets (and others, such as the inter-
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bank or senior debt markets) were still not complete-
ly open to small and medium-sized institutions. 
The crisis burst the real estate bubble in Spain, thus 
further complicating the banks’ funding problems, 
and increasing the proportion of non-performing 
loans. By the end of 2011, land prices, adjusted for 
inflation, had fallen about 30 percent from the 2007 
peak, and home prices were off by about 22 percent. 
House prices fell by 11.2 percent in 2011 alone, while 
in Madrid, prices went down by 29.5 percent. Expec-
tations, however, are still that the original house price 
increases may be reversed, so prices would have to 
fall 40 percent from that level (Financial Times, 11 
April 2011). The implosion of the real estate mar-
ket exposed the vulnerability of the banking sector 
to that market, which constituted 60 percent of the 
banking loans (i.e., loans to families, enterprises in 
the real estate sector, or direct real estate assets), as 
explained in the previous section. 
Unlike in Italy, the main fiscal problem in Spain was 
not the total amount of its public debt, but rather its 
total net foreign debt. Indeed, the debt ratio that re-
ally matters in determining a country’s solvency is 
not so much the ratio of net public debt to GDP, but 
total public and private external debt (see Table 4). 
In the case of Spain it reached 170 percent of GDP at 
the end of 2012. In Italy it reached ‘only’ 124 percent 
(Munchau 2013). Furthermore, most of Spain’s exter-
nal debt positions originated from banks (as opposed 
to the government or NFC). About half of it was short 
term, and half long term; foreign direct investment 
was limited; and finally, the monetary authorities – 
central banks – increased their already high net debt 
positions during the crisis (see Figure 1).  As a con-
sequence, the country’s problems intensified when 
foreign investors became reluctant to refinance debt, 
as reflected by increasing yields in 2011 and 2012. 
The high degree of Spain’s external indebtedness 
was partly the consequence of record current account 
deficits and capital inflows that Spain experienced 
during the first decade of EMU membership. 
Italy managed a public debt over 100 percent of GDP 
throughout the last three decades, but the level of pri-
vate debt was rather low. On the negative side, the 
Italian government failed to take advantage of low 
interest rates following the entry of the country into 
the EMU – a move that would have substantially 
reduced the outstanding public debt (Bini Smaghi 
2013). On the positive side, Italy ran a primary sur-
plus from 1992 on, with the exception of a prima-
ry deficit in 2009 and 2010, mainly due to a falling 
growth rate (see Table 1). The main problem in the 
Italian case was not so much the high level of public 
debt, especially when accounting for the relatively 
low level of private debt (see Table 4) and that public 
debt was mostly held domestically. It was the low 
growth rate that raised serious issue regarding public 
debt sustainability (Jones 2012). Italy has been suf-
fering from low economic growth for more than a 
decade; it experienced 0.54 percent annual average 
real GDP growth between 2000 and 2010, compared 
to 1.37 percent for the euroarea, whereas economic 
performance in Spain was significantly better (thanks 
largely to the real state bubble) in the decade prior to 
the bubble.
Unlike Spain, Italy had limited external indebted-
ness (see Table 4) and did not experience high level 
of capital inflows. This was the consequence of the 
relatively small current account deficits that Italy saw 
during the first decade of EMU membership and the 
high savings rate in the country (see Table 1). Un-
like Spain, Italy had the second-largest manufactur-
ing and industrial base in Europe, after Germany, and 
is one of the biggest export-oriented economies in 
the euroarea. ‘Made in Italy’ is still a valuable brand 
around the world. Furthermore, Italian banks, unlike 
those in Spain, did not channel capital inflows into 
a property bubble. Most Italian bank lending was to 
manufacturing and service sectors (see Section 2 and 
Table 2). Like Spanish banks, Italian banks borrowed 
in international markets through securitization, but 
Italian securitization assets comprised half of that in 
Spain, as measured as a percentage of GDP. More-
over, fewer than half of Italian securitization was 
residential mortgages (Hardie and Howarth 2013), 
which were badly hit by the implosion of the prop-
erty bubble.
Yet, the global financial crisis eventually precipi-
tated a balance of payment crisis in Italy in January 
2011 caused by a massive sell-off of Italian sovereign 
debt and Italian bank stocks. In addition, there was 
evidence of a drain on bank deposits as well (Jones 
2012). Italy, akin to Spain, experienced significant 
18
ces papers - open forum # 12
capital outflows during summer 2011. The liquida-
tion of Italian public debt held by foreign investors 
caused capital outflows. Italian bonds were sold in 
large quantities because they were no longer con-
sidered risk free assets. In the TARGET 2 system, 
the Bank of Italy, previously a creditor, became a net 
debtor after late 2007 (see Figure 1). 
The ECB responded to these market developments 
and to the increasing spread on Italian and Spanish 
government bonds by establishing the Long-Term 
Refinancing Operation (LTRO) in December 2011. 
The ECB issued loans at a one percent interest rate 
for a three-year period to European banks, requiring 
government bonds, mortgage securities, and other 
commercial papers in bank portfolio as collateral. 
Concurrently, the ECB changed its collateral rules, 
accepting lower quality collateral in return for loans. 
Under this program, the ECB loaned 489bn euros 
to 523 banks, mainly in Greece, Ireland, Italy, and 
Spain. Indeed, Italian and Spanish banks took nearly 
sixty percent of all new ECB loans, with Spain’s 
overstretched banks taking marginally more than 
Italy’s.   Banks used these funds to buy government 
bonds, effectively easing the debt crisis. In February 
2012, following the second Greek bailout, the ECB 
held another three-year auction of 529bn euros to 800 
European banks. Although the ECB program did not 
specifically target Italy or Spain, these countries ben-
efited from a temporary reduction in borrowing costs. 
The ECB lent to euroarea banks, which in turn lent to 
euroarea governments using the purchased govern-
ment debt as collateral for even more ECB loans. Eu-
roarea market instability and unsustainable borrowing 
costs for countries such as Spain and Italy led to the 
ECB’s decision, announced on 6 September 2012, to 
purchase euroarea countries’ short-term bonds in sec-
ondary markets, as part of the new program dubbed 
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT). However, 
they required beneficiary governments to apply for 
euroarea rescue funds in compliance with OMT con-
ditions in exchange for support. To date, neither Italy 
nor Spain have applied for it.
Both Spain and Italy suffered from a loss of com-
petitiveness since joining EMU. Between the intro-
duction of the euro in 2008, unit labor costs in the 
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manufacturing sector – the strongest indicator of the 
economic competitiveness – continued increasing 
more rapidly in both Italy and Spain than the EU10 
average (see Figure 2). During that period, the coun-
tries’ productivity marginally increased. According 
to the World Economic Forum’s annual 2012 com-
petitiveness ranking, ‘one of the shared features of 
the current situation in all these [Southern European] 
economies is their persistent lack of competitive-
ness…. Over all, low levels of productivity and com-
petitiveness do not warrant the salaries that workers 
in Southern Europe enjoy and have led to unsustain-
able imbalances, follow by high and rising unem-
ployment.’
5. Conclusions
This paper asked why Spain experienced a full-
fledged sovereign debt crisis resorting to euroarea 
financial assistance for its banks, whereas Italy did 
not. The answer is that Spain had both a banking 
crisis and a balance of payment crisis, whereas It-
aly only experienced a balance of payments crisis. 
Banks in Spain played a key role in the build-up of 
the banking and balance of payments crises, Italian 
banks did not do so. Banks in Spain (to be precise, 
the cajas) turbocharged a property bubble, funded 
through short-term capital inflows, which resulted in 
high net foreign debt. The implosion of this property 
bubble coupled with dependence on wholesale mar-
ket liabilities in addition to the depth of the economic 
crisis, meant trouble for the Spanish cajas, triggering 
a traditional banking crisis. The cajas, unlike Italian 
banks and Spanish large commercial banks, suffered 
heavy losses and ‘banked on the state’ for financial 
support (paraphrasing Haldane and Alessandri 2009). 
A balance of payment crisis followed, due to sudden 
and significant capital outflows. The Spanish govern-
ment did not have sufficient funds to recapitalize its 
ailing banks resorting instead to euroarea funds. In-
deed, Reinhart and Rogoff  (2009) show how histori-
cally, most sovereign debt crises started off as bank-
ing crises. 
By contrast, Italian banks did not fuel a property bub-
ble and were not burdened by unsustainable levels of 
mortgage debt, therefore avoiding significant losses 
during the global financial crisis. Unlike in Spain, 
Italian banks were not instrumental in fostering sig-
nificant pre-crisis capital inflows; hence, Italian net 
foreign debt remained limited, and the country had 
a lower gross external debt position than Spain (124 
percent of GDP versus 170 percent in Spain). Italy, 
however, experienced significant capital outflows 
in summer 2011, when foreign investors sold large 
quantities of Italian public bonds, requiring ECB in-
terventions. The problem for Italy was the vicious 
circle of an economic recession, lack of credit, and a 
public sector with very limited resources to stimulate 
the economy (OECD 2010). The high level of debt 
that minimally increased during the crisis coupled 
with the low level of growth raised concern of the 
debt sustainability.
As for the ‘so what’ question, developing further the 
bank-based literature pioneered by Hardie and How-
arth (2013), this research identifies two distinctive 
features of bank business models and national bank-
ing systems that account for the different sovereign 
debt crisis scenarios in Italy and Spain. These find-
ings can be extended to other countries, especially 
those at the periphery of Europe. 
With reference to bank business models, the crucial 
difference was that Spanish banks borrowed (most-
ly short-term) funding on the wholesale market and 
channeled them into the construction sector, fuelling 
a property bubble (like in Ireland) and fostering mas-
sive capital inflows. Italian banks (like Greek banks) 
borrowed less on the wholesale market and did not 
lend substantially to the construction sector. Capital 
inflows in Italy and Greece were mainly purchases of 
government bonds with the difference that in Greece 
a higher percentage of government debt was held by 
non-residents. Spain and Ireland experienced a prop-
erty bubble, which was followed by major losses for 
banks when the bubble imploded. Italy and Greece 
did not have a property boom and bust. They expe-
rienced a traditional fiscal crisis and balance of pay-
ments crisis, following the sell-off of government 
debt by non-residents. 
The second important feature concerns the duality of 
national banking system, as was the case in Spain, 
but not in Italy. It explains why some parts of the 
banking sector were heavily politicized in Spain and 
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were able to escape to some extent the normal regu-
latory framework and the supervision of the Bank of 
Spain. Other countries at the periphery of Europe did 
not have a dual banking system like Spain. Howev-
er, Germany and Austria had a three-pillar banking 
system that somewhat resembled the Spanish one. 
And indeed, public banks in Germany (especially the 
Landesbanken) experienced serious losses during the 
global financial crisis (Hardie and Howarth 2009), 
and required financial assistance from the govern-
ment. The German government, unlike the Spanish 
one, was in a position to do so. Italian banks, which 
were subject to the stringent supervision of the Bank 
of Italy, were marginally hit by the global banking 
crisis and required minimal financial support from 
the state.
Whereas the role of banks in the play out of the bank-
ing crisis is not much of a novelty, more insightful 
is their role in the build up of the macroeconomic 
imbalances that led to the balance of payments crisis. 
This paper focuses on banks in Spain and Italy. How-
ever a similar analysis could be extended not only 
to banks in other debtor countries, such as Ireland 
and Portugal, but also to banks in creditor countries 
that were indeed heavily exposed in Southern Europe 
when the sovereign debt crisis broke out. Capital in-
flows from banks in creditor countries fuelled mac-
roeconomic imbalances in debtor countries. When 
these banks suddenly pulled out some of their invest-
ment, they worsened the crisis in the periphery. This 
analysis suggests that the causes of the crisis were 
complex, and that banks within (and outside) debtor 
countries played a major role in it.
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endnotes
1. However, Italy, like Spain, benefited substantially from the European Central Bank’s purchase 
of government bonds in the secondary markets attempting to reduce borrowing costs. For an 
overview of governments’ reactions to the crisis in several countries, see Bermeo and Pontusson 
(2012).
2. Cuñat and Garicano (2009) have shown that cajas with politically connected chief executives 
with no previous banking experience and no graduate education did substantially worse in the 
run up to the crisis (i.e., the executives granted more real estate developer loans, up to half of 
the entire loan book, in some instances) and during the crisis with higher non-performing loans.
3. Spanish banks increased their ECB borrowings by more than six times between June 2011 and 
October 2013. In March 2012, they borrowed a record 316bn euros from the ECB, 28 percent of 
the euroarea total, the highest level in absolute terms among euro area banking systems (Royo 
2013b). 
4. This deal was subsequently investigated by Italian magistrates, following accusations of cor-
ruption and fraud.
5. The Palio is the historical bareback horse race in the town square. 
6. Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) estimated that the accumulated net position of the Northern eu-
roarea central banks reached 800bn euros in December 2011, matched by the southern euroarea 
central banks’ equally negative position.
7. Reported by the BBC www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-18058270 on 4 May 2012.
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